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ABSTRACT

In this paper agency theory has been used to interpret traveller
preference heterogeneity in mode choice to understand agency
problems. An agency problem is defined as a principal’s dissatisfaction
with the outcome of an agent’s performance. Sydney statistical
division travellers are considered as the principal and Transport for
NSW (TfNSW) is treated as the agent. An agent performs the tasks
that are delegated by the principal and thus a metaphoric contract
is developed between them and travellers, for instance, show their
satisfaction with the reliability and comfort of the transport service.
TfNSW is expected to satisfy travellers’ desired services. Therefore,
it is imperative to analyse traveller preferences to understand their
desires/demands. Random parameter logit models are employed to
analyse the travellers’ demand to explore travellers’ dissatisfaction
(the agency problem). The analysis reveals that this agency problem
exists in the association between traveller and TfNSW because the
probability of using a private car for transport is high. The preference
for use of private transport is evidence of dissatisfaction of travellers
with public transport. This paper identifies the dominant attributes
of traveller preferences and then devises an approach to increase the
use of public transport and reduce the agency problem.
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Introduction
From the context of transport management in Sydney, it is assumed that Transport for
New South Wales (TfNSW) behaves in such way as to satisfy NSW travellers and provide
a better transport service. The role of TfNSW, as an agent, is to maximise the utility of
the travellers’ (the principal) satisfactions within available resources by providing suitable
modes of transport services. In order to understand the utility function of travellers towards
mode choice, the TfNSW should have information about the nature of travellers’ desires
and expectations based on choice attributes both observed and latent. Thus, an inferred
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Table 1. Summary of extant research.
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Issues/subjects
Government support
programs (GSPs) and
academic entrepreneurship
Labour market

Methods used
Agency theory

Findings
The GSPs have an effect on reducing the agency
problems in the relationship

Sources
Rasmussen and
Gulbrandsen (2012)

Agency theory and
dichotomisation
process

In the private sector, the principal is largely conCohen and Baruch
trolling the agents’ activities via contemporary
(2010)
HRM systems and by tying wages to performance. On the contrary, the principal’s lack of
control over the agent’s activities is noticed in
the public sector
Capital planning and
Interview and
Hospital planning process should necessarily be
Thompson and
financing
principal-agent
informed by an explicit understanding of powMcKee (2011)
model
erful groups (e.g. central government) involved
and their divergent preferences and utilities to
avoid agency problems
Supply chain manageAgency theoAgent-based factors such as information asym- Zu and Kaynak (2012)
ment
ry and outmetry, goal conflict, risk aversion of suppliers,
come-based and
length of relationship, and task characteristics,
behaviour-based
can be expected to influence how firms design
approaches
and manage their quality management systems
for supply chains
Risk management
Framework of
Empirical results indicate that purchasing
Zsidisin and Ellram
agency theory
organisations address various sources of supply
(2003)
risk by implementing management techniques
that reduce the likelihood that detrimental
events will occur. Firm size, purchases as a
percentage of sales, and industry characteristics
have also been found to influence the manner
in which supplier behaviours are managed
Public transportation
Structural equation
Public transportation offers low utility due to
Andreassen (1995)
model
low degree of congruence between user preferences and service provided. Increased utility
may increase new customers and thus agency
relationship may improve
Managerial ownership
Logistics regresThe risk at lower level of managerial is signifAhmed (2009)
sion approach
icant and positive relations with managerial
ownership concentration. This supports the
hypothesis that a higher level of managerial
ownership can reduce the agency conflict
between external equity claimholders and
managers
Organisational manage- Mixed logit model Agency theory and stewardship theory are not Puyvelde, Caers, Bois,
ment
necessarily in conflict with each other but can
and Jegers (2013)
be combined into a more general governance
framework for non-profit organisations. Consequently, incentive structures that incorporate
different types of objectives can facilitate the
recruitment and retention of employees in
non-profit organisations
Doctor and patients’
Logit model
GPs are not fully aware of patient preferences
Pedersen, Kaer, Kragpreferences
at an aggregate level. Even though GPs almost
strup, and Hansen
succeeded in predicting the rank order of
(2012), Scott and Vick
preferences in the unforced choice, there is still
(1999)
room for improving the agency relationship in
the organisation of general practice

relationship is understood to exist between the ‘traveller’ and ‘TfNSW’. Such a two party
relationship is indicated in agency theory (AT).
AT, also known as the Principal-Agent or Principal AT/Model, describes the relationship between two or more parties in which one party is designated as the principal that
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assigns another party, called the agent, to perform tasks on behalf of the principal (Jensen
& Meckling, 1976; Moe, 1984; Ross, 1973). AT assumes that the agent has more information than the principal (Grammenos & Papapostolou, 2012), a condition that is known as
informational asymmetry, and this adversely affects the principal’s ability to monitor the
agent’s activities. Another assumption of AT is that both principal and agent act rationally
and try to maximise their own interests, which ultimately results in a conflict of interest/
choice that is referred to as moral hazard (Jensen & Meckling, 1976); that is the dilemma of
acting against the interest of the principal as the agent tries to maximise its own interests.
Since the principal does not have access to decisions that are made by an agent, it is unable
to monitor whether the agent’s action(s) are in their best interests. This is called adverse
selection or choice conflict.
Because of the useful assumptions of AT discussed above, the theory is being applied
to different fields (Kivisto, 2005). Table 1 summarises the contemporary research on AT
in different sectors.
The research described in Table 1 shows that AT is being used in various fields including
transportation. Examination of the relationship between traveller and transport service
providers is rare in extant research. When travellers entrust their choice for safe, reliable,
comfortable and cheap transport to the TfNSW, this creates a metaphorical contract, known
as an agency contract (Anwar, Tieu, Gibson, Win, & Berryman, 2014), between travellers
and the TfNSW. This contract is often characterised by an agency problem because mode
choice is driven by a traveller’s heterogeneous set of preferences which are not addressed
adequately by the TfNSW. In most cases, the TfNSW performs its task well by aligning with
government preference (such as a limited budget) although it is assumed that travellers’
satisfaction and choice preference should be maximised by TfNSW.
In this study, traveller preference and utility are regarded as key indicators of the traveller–TfNSW relationship. Traveller preference is only one of the major choice functions
that have a multitude of influences on TfNSW, but consideration of traveller preference
in project design and implementation may reduce project failure. There are also a large
number of actors, both internal and external, who affect the success or failure of a transport
project (Anwar, 2013). This means that TfNSW may need to compromise with multiple sets
of interests while it performs on behalf of the traveller and, therefore, choice conflicts may
arise. The ability of TfNSW to resolve these conflicts will significantly affect its success or
failure to overcome agency problem.
Likewise, utility is regarded as a key indicator of traveller satisfaction. The idea of an
individual’s utility function is expressed by the gain of satisfaction, which may be financial,
social and/or psychic, in a mathematical form. These gains are called ‘utility’ from an economic point of view, and the idea of utility is that individuals tries to maximise their utility
(i.e. gains) over the set of possible choice sets that are obtainable.
AT argues that agency problems arise from the informational asymmetries and choice
conflict in the traveller and TfNSW relationship. AT considers this relationship as a contractual phenomenon (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), where the agent or TfNSW is to perform
services on behalf of the travellers. Based on these assumptions, both principal and agent are
rational economic entities and both are self-interested maximisers of their choice utility. The
idea of a ‘contract’ in AT is introduced to recognise the necessary metaphorical agreement
between the principal and the agent that specifies the obligations of each party. This implies
that TfNSW is obliged to provide transport service as travellers demand. Accordingly,
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traveller preference is an element that influences utility and needs to be analysed from the
TfNSW point of view to achieve a balanced agency relationship (Anwar et al., 2014). Thus,
in order to achieve a balanced agency relationship, considering traveller preferences in the
planning and management process is imperative. According to the AT, if most of the people
use public transportation (trains and buses only), the optimal condition is achieved. That
means that to obtain a reliable agency relationship, an acceptable agency problem, public
transport use should be higher than private car use.
In summary, travellers entrust their desires for reliable modes of transport to the TfNSW
and assume that the TfNSW can be an effective agent to provide it. Limited access by the
traveller to monitor the TfNSW’s performance is observed and this causes choice conflicts.
The TfNSW provides public transport, such as trains and buses, for the traveller and tries to
accommodate customer expectations into the service. Travellers also have the opportunity
to use their own cars (private transport). In this situation, a traveller makes choices between
the use of their private car and public transport based on their utility maximisation concept, determined by choice preferences. Once travellers perceive the maximum utility, they
choose that particular mode of transport. Based on their mode choice, whenever there is
a low use of public transport it is likely that the TfNSW is not performing well enough to
satisfy travellers’ expectations; an agency conflict is created. In contrast, whenever there is
a high use of public transport, the TfNSW is performing well enough to satisfy travellers’
expectations and an agency conflict is avoided.

Research methodology
Data
The data source for this research was the cross-sectional 2010/11 household travel survey
(HTS) data released in 2012. This was the largest and most comprehensive HTS of Sydney
collected by the Bureau of transport statistics (BTS) of TfNSW. The BTS conducted a household questionnaire survey in three areas: Sydney, Newcastle and the Illawarra, and collected
three types of data: Household, Person and Trip data. Later on the BTS created linked trip
data that has not been used in this paper. For this present paper, only ‘Sydney Statistical
Division (SSD)’ and ‘person trip data’ were considered for analysis. The HTS consisted of a
face-to-face interview survey carried out every day from July to June of the financial year
2010/11. This collection method ensured high data quality and maximised response rates.
Each respondent was requested to maintain a simple travel diary to record the details of
all trips undertaken for the nominated last 24-h period. An interviewer then interviewed
each respondent to collect the details of each trip. For further details about the HTS, its
scope, coverage and methodology, please see Bureau of Transport Statistics (BTS, 2012).
Description of variables
Six latent variables (LVs) and 13 socio-demographic variables (SDVs) are evaluated in this
paper to analyse traveller preference heterogeneity and to explore the association between
traveller choice and service provided by TfNSW. LVs are: (i) comfort, (ii) convenience, (iii)
safety, (iv) flexibility, (v) reliability and (vi) satisfaction and 20 indicators (Table 2) were
set to explain them. Because of limited information in the HTS data-set, these indicators
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Table 2. LVs and their indicators.
Latent variables
Comfort
Convenience
Safety

Label
y1
y2
y3
y4
y5
y6
y7

Explained by (indicators) Anwar et al. (2014)
Enjoy time to read/relax on vehicle
Stressfulness on vehicle
Service slower
Alternative mode availability
Accessibility (does not go where required)
Timetable availability
Safety response for mode used in 1st trip

y8

Safety response for mode used in 2nd trip

y9
y10

Safety response for mode used in 3rd trip
Fixed start and finish times at office – each day
can vary
Rotating shift (work flexibility)
Roster shift (work flexibility)
Variable hours (work flexibility)
Frequency (travel mode, e.g. bus)
Punctuality (for public transport)
Faster (for public transport)
Cleanliness (cleanliness inside vehicle)
Travel time
Travel cost
Waiting time
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Flexibility

Reliability
Satisfaction

y11
y12
y13
y14
y15
y16
y17
y18
y19
y20

Definitions
Importance with 1, otherwise 0
Importance with 1, otherwise 0
Importance with 1, otherwise 0
Importance with 1, otherwise 0
Importance with 1, otherwise 0
Importance with 1, otherwise 0
perceived a safe trip with 1,
otherwise 0
perceived a safe trip with 1,
otherwise 0
perceived a safe with 1, otherwise 0
Importance with 1, otherwise 0
Importance with 1, otherwise 0
Importance with 1, otherwise 0
Importance with 1, otherwise 0
Importance with 1, otherwise 0
Importance with 1, otherwise 0
Importance with 1, otherwise 0
Importance with 1, otherwise 0
Travel time in minutes
Travel cost in Australian dollar
Waiting time in minutes

are considered only to represent LVs in this paper. The 13 explanatory variables (objective
attributes) are: annual income (in Australian dollars), age (in years), gender (1 if male, 0
otherwise), having children (0–14 years), car ownership, family size, full-time workers of
household, travel time (in minutes), travel cost (in Australian dollars), waiting time (in
minutes), trip rate (trips per person per day), trip purpose (1 if work, 0 otherwise) and
distance travelled (in kilometres).
In HTS, the respondents (travellers) were asked about the reason for choosing a particular mode of transport (private or public) and some multiple answers were given. Travellers
answered with the appropriate reason according to their experiences. For example, if ‘enjoy
time to read/relax on vehicle’ was answered by a respondent as a reason for choosing a particular mode, it implied that the respondent views this indicator as important and, therefore,
this indicator was marked 1 otherwise 0 (zero). In this way, y1–y6, y14–y17 and y10–y13 were
determined by either 1 or 0.
The indicators y7–y9 were used to represent safety. The travellers were asked about their
experience travelling on the first three trips; whether they feel safe. There were five possible
answers: (i) always; (ii) mostly; (iii) sometimes; (iv) rarely and (v) never. If the travellers
answered (i) to (iii), it means they perceived the trip with the particular mode as safe. On
the other hand, responses to (iv) and (v) indicate that the trip by this mode was thought
to be unsafe. Therefore, if they responded to (i) to (iii), they perceived the trip to be safe,
otherwise not. In this way, the indicators were marked for 1 if the respondents put a tick
in (i) to (iii) otherwise 0 (zero).
Modelling issues
The analysis specifically investigates the influences SDVs and LVs on mode choice probability to explore the agency problem and devise an approach to minimise the problem.

Downloaded by [University of Wollongong] at 14:33 09 February 2016

Urban, Planning and Transport Research 

31

Figure 1. Structure of mode choice probability process.

Figure 1 describes the overall structure of the mode choice probability process for exploring
the agency problem.
Econometric methods1
There are two approaches available for incorporating LVs into the choice models (i) the
sequential approach (also known as two-step approach), where the LVs are needed to be
constructed before being included into the discrete choice model as regular explanatory
variables (Ashok, William, & Yuan, 2002; Johansson, Heldt, & Johansson, 2006). Step 1 is the
estimation of a MIMIC (multiple indicators and multiple causes) model; a type of regression
model with a latent dependent variable(s). Step 2 is the estimation of a choice model with
random parameters; information from the first step is incorporated in the second step; and
(ii) the simultaneous approach, where both processes are performed simultaneously (Bolduc,
Boucher, & Alvarez-Daziano, 2008).
Ben-Akiva et al. (2002) argue that results obtained using the second approach are more
consistent and rational than the other approach but this second approach is not popular
because of its complexity. Interestingly, the estimated results using both sequential and
simultaneous approaches were not statistically different (Raveau, Alvarez-Daziano, Yanez,
Bolduc, & Ortuzar, 2010) and this is motivation to employ the first approach in this study
because it is not so cumbersome to use.
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Modelling with LVs
A MIMIC model, that defines LVs appropriately, is estimated first where the LVs (ηijl) are
explained by characteristics (sijr) of the users (individuals), alternatives (mode alternative)
and trip nature using the structural equation (Equation 1). As the analysts cannot collect
data on LVs directly, indicators (yijp) are assigned to explain them through measurement
∑
using Equation (2):
𝜂ijl =
𝛼jlr × sijr + 𝜈ijl
(1)
r

yijp =

∑

𝛾jlp × 𝜂ijl + 𝜁ijp
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(2)

where i refers to an individual, j refers to an alternative, l is an LV, r refers to explanatory
variables that belong to SDVs, and p refers to an indicator. αjlr and γjlp are parameters to be
estimated, while νijl and ζijp are error terms with mean of zero and standard deviation to be
estimated. The above specifications of the MIMIC model are not restricted to the estimation
of parameters and the results of the model depend on the selected variables.
Specifications of the latent variable model
Factor analysis was employed to investigate the structural relationships in the MIMIC
model (describes in Table 3) that guide the specification for computation of LVs (Figure 2
illustrates the results of this process) and results in the following set of equations.
Comfortij = 𝛼inc - com,j ×Incomei +𝛼tco−com,j ×Travel costi +𝛼wti - com,j ×Waiting timei +𝛼car - com,j ×Car ownershipi +𝛼dt−com,j ×Distance travelledi +𝛼chi−com,j ×Having childreni +ncom,

Convenienceij = 𝛼age - conv,j ×Agei +𝛼gen−conv,j ×Genderi +𝛼car - conv,j ×Car ownershipi +𝛼wti - conv,j ×Waiting timei +𝛼tti - conv,j ×Travel timei +𝛼chi−conv,j ×Having childreni +𝛼inc−conv,j ×

Safetyij = 𝛼age−saf,j ×Agei +𝛼tr−saf,j ×Trip ratei +𝛼car−saf,j ×Car ownershipi +𝛼dt−saf,j ×Dist𝛼nce travelledi +𝛼chi−saf,j ×Having childreni +𝛼wti−saf,j ×Waiting timei +nsaf,ij

Flexibilityij = 𝛼gen - fle,j ×Genderi +𝛼chi−fle,j ×Having childreni +𝛼car - fle,j ×Car ownershipi +𝛼tp−fle,j ×Trip purpopsei +𝛼tp−fle,j ×Trip purpopsei +nfle,ij

Reliabilityij = 𝛼tti−rel,j ×Travel timei +𝛼wti−rel,j ×Waiting timei +𝛼ft−rel,j ×Full time workersi +𝛼car - rel,j ×Car ownershipi +𝛼dt−rel,j ×Distance travelledi +nrel,ij

Satisfactionij = 𝛼tti−sat,j × Travel timei + 𝛼tco−sat,j × Travel costi + 𝛼wti−sat,j × Waiting timei + 𝛼car - sat,j × Car ownershipi + 𝛼age−sat,j × Agei + nsat,ij

yy1,ij = γy1,j × Comfortij + ζy1,ij
yy2,ij = γy2,j × Comfortij + ζy2,ij
yy3,ij = γy3,j × Comfortij + ζy3,iq
yy4,ij = γy4,j × Convenienceij + ζy4,ij
yy5,ij = γy5,j × Convenienceij + ζy5,ij
yy6,ij = γy6,j × Convenienceij + ζy6,ij
yy7ij = γy7,j × Safetyij + ζy7,ij
yy8,iq = γy8,j × Safetyij + ζy8,ij
yy9,ij = γy9,j × Safetyij + ζy9,ij
yy10,ij = γy10,j × Flexibilityij + ζy10,ij

yy11,ij = γy11,j × Flexibilityij + ζy11,ij
yy12,ij = γy12,j × Flexibilityij + ζy12,ij
yy13,ij = γy13,j × Flexibilityij + ζy13,ij
yy14,ij = γy14,j × Reliabilityij + ζy14,ij
yy15,ij = γy15,j × Reliabilityij + ζy15,ij
yy16,ij = γy16,j × Reliabilityij + ζy16,ij
yy17,ij = γy17,j × Satisfactionij + ζy17,ij
yy18,ij = γy18,j × Satisfactionij + ζy18,ij
yy19,ij = γy19,j × Satisfactionij + ζy19,ij
yy20,ij = γy20,j × Satisfactionij + ζy20,ij

Figure 2 follows the path to the results of α-vector matrix of structural equations
described in Table 3 (which were estimated using the computer programme AMOS v.19).
It is assumed that attributes which obtain a minimum .1 coefficient explain a particular
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LV. For example, ‘comfort’ is explained by six (6) attributes of ‘car ownership’, ‘travel cost’,
‘having children’, ‘waiting time’, ‘distance travelled’ and ‘income’ of the traveller because
all these attributes have at least a .1 coefficient (Table 3). Attributes that had a coefficient
less than .1 were not used to describe an LV. The coefficient in the linear regression model
(e.g. structural equation model) indicates the strength of impact/influence that causes an
effect on the dependent variable. The t-value represents the significance. Strength is more
associated with dependent variables to signify the influence and, therefore, a cut-off point
was set to simplify the model.
These estimated matrix parameters using the MIMIC model were also used to quantify
LVs that were incorporated in RPL models (Table 5) as explanatory variables. The alpha
values in Table 3 are same for all alternatives. The choice of mode (i.e. alternatives) is the
dependent variable and the factors described in Table 3 influence travellers in their mode
choice decision-making process.
Hybrid discrete choice modelling
By maximising the utility (Uij), individuals take a decision based on the assumption of random utility theory. It is also assumed that an analyst can only determine a representative
portion (systematic component) of the utility (Vij) function, therefore, an error term (εij)
for each alternative (Ortuzar & Willumsen, 2001) is required to be included in the function
as a stochastic component. Mathematically, the utility function becomes:

Uij = Vij + 𝜀ij ,

(3)

where Vij is a function of objective attributes Xijk, such as travel time and cost, socio-economic and trip characteristics of the individual and k stands for all objective variables
together.
Equation (4) is derived by including LVs in the utility function, where θjk and βjl are
parameters to be estimated:
∑
∑
Vij =
𝜃jk × Xijk +
𝛽jl × 𝜂ijl
(4)
k

l

Only the alternative j is chosen, if the utility of alternative ‘j’ is greater than or equal to the
utility of all other alternatives ‘t’ (all t includes alternative j) in the choice set C. This can be
expressed mathematically with binary variables dij:
{
1 if Uij ≥ Uit , ∀t ∈ C
dij =
(5)
0 other case
As a sequential approach was used in this study, the discrete choice model is estimated
with the MIMIC model’s structure and measurement Equations (1) and (2) (Ben-Akiva
et al., 2002).
Specifications of the RPL model
Because of its ability to measure random taste variation and to allow an unrestricted substitution pattern and correlation among unobserved factors that help to address the limitations
of initially innovated logit models, (e.g. multinomial (MNL) and nested logit (NL) models)
the RPL model shows better performance. The standard deviations of random parameters

Anwar et al. (2015).

Model fit criteria
GFI
AGFI
NFI
CFI
RMSEA
Lower bound
Upper bound

Satisfaction

Reliability

Safety

Flexibility

Convenience

LVs
Comfort

Travel
time
−.045
(–3.16)
−.211
(–7.27)
−.092
(–3.47)
−.091
(–4.22)
−.514
(–6.21)
−.192
(–3.91)

−.166 (–6.21)

−.011 −2.01

−.012 (–3.04)

−.003 (–1.99)

−.102 (–1.71)

Travel cost
−.212 (–3.86)

Waiting
time
−.165
(–5.71)
−.216
(–5.13)
−.066
(–1.89)
−.132
(–3.91)
−.107
(–6.11)
−.121
(–3.71)
Age
−.011
(–2.91)
−.125
(–2.21)
−.088
(–3.41)
−.21
(–4.67)
−.042
(–1.89)
−.142
(–5.11)

Income
.121
(2.87)
.156
(2.53)
.031
(1.90)
−.088
(–2.89)
.031
(2.12)
.032
(3.90)

Family
size
−.002
(–3.01)
−.002
(–2.76)
.022
(3.01)
.005
(3.64)
−.005
(–2.11)
−.008
(–2.12)
.139 (5.11)

−.117
(–5.15)
−.219
(–7.72)
.414 (4.56)

.275 (5.48)

Car ownership
.301 (6.12)

No.
child
.202
(3.89)
.189
(4.51)
−.131
(–5.31)
−.166
(–6.61)
.003
(4.11)
.092
(6.15)

.963
.945
.901
.950
.033
.013 (90% CI of RMSEA)
.048 (90% CI of RMSEA)

Gender
.061
(4.1)
.126
(2.63)
−.102
(–2.13)
−.098
(–4.12)
.012
(3.07)
−.087
(–3.21)

Table 3. MIMIC model results: α vector matrix of structural equations (t-values in the parenthesis).
Full
time
.006
(2.01)
.002
(1.67)
−.007
(–2.85)
−.008
(–2.44)
.007
(2.12)
.007
(5.16)
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Trip rate
.038
(2.21)
.117
(2.51)
.001
(2.13)
.112
(3.01)
.016
(3.19)
.097
(6.91)

.062 (5.33)

.112 (3.12)

.171 (3.69)

.013 (4.11)

.11 (2.63)

Distance
travelled
.123 (3.81)

Trip
purpose
.021
(1.90)
.131
(2.01)
.126
(4.20)
.041
(2.58)
.009
(2.51)
.068
(3.01)
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Figure 2. Latent variables model relationships.

in this model depict the degree of unobserved heterogeneity; and heterogeneity around
the mean describes the interaction between random parameters and specified attributes.
According to Equation (3), the utility that an individual i receives from alternative j is
denoted by Uij, which is the sum of the systematic component Vij and a stochastic component εij and has a linear relationship.
Within a logit context a condition is imposed such that εij is the independent and identically distributed (IID) extreme value type 1 (Gumbel Distribution). Initially, independence
of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) property is also appeared in logit models such as MNL and
NL models. These limitations (IID and IIA) should be taken into account in some way. For
example, the stochastic component can be divided into two additive parts that are uncorrelated. One part is correlated and heteroskedastic among the alternatives and the other
part is IID over alternatives and individuals
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Uij = xij 𝛽j + (zij 𝛿i + eij )

(6)

where xij is a vector of explanatory variables that are observed by the analyst; βj is a vector of parameters to be estimated; zij is a vector of characteristics that can vary between
individuals or alternatives, or both (there may be some common elements in both zij and
xij); eij is a random term with zero mean that is IID over individuals and alternatives and
is normalised to set the scale of utility; random variable (δi) is a vector of random terms
with zero mean that varies over individuals according to the distribution f(δ|Ω), where Ω
are the fixed parameters of the distribution f.
In matrix form, it can be written as:
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U = X𝛽 + (Z𝛿 + e)

(7)

If IIA exists, then δ = 0 for all i and so utility U depends only on the systematic and IID
stochastic portion of utility. Initially innovated logit models assume that IIA does not estimate Zδ; thus δ is assumed as zero. Because of this, unobserved taste variations are not
addressed in initially innovated logit models. Hence, by incorporating the effect of Zδ in
the utility function, discrete choice models are able to accommodate those impacts and thus
avoid the IIA assumption. These models estimate Ω (the parameters of the distribution of
δ) as well as β.
To derive a RPL model from Equation (7), e is assumed to be a IID extreme value, while
δ follows a general distribution f(δ|Ω). If δ = 0, it is MNL which has the IIA property.
Estimation of the RPL generally involves estimating β and Ω. The choice probabilities
depend on β and δ and the probability to select alternative j for individual i with conditional
on δ is similar as the MNL model below:

� �
eXj 𝛽j +Zj 𝛿
P j��𝛿 = Lj(𝛿) = ∑ X 𝛽 +Z 𝛿
e kk k

(8)

k∈J

As δ is not given, by integrating over all values of δ weighted by the density of δ, the unconditional choice probability for each individual can be obtained as below.

��
P j =

⎡
⎤
⎢ eXj 𝛽j +Zj 𝛿 ⎥
f ( 𝛿�Ω)𝜕𝛿
∫ ⎢⎢ ∑ eXk 𝛽k +Zk 𝛿 ⎥⎥
𝛿 ⎣ k∈J
⎦

(9)

i.e.

()
P j =

∫

Lj(𝛿)f ( 𝛿|Ω)𝜕𝛿

(10)

𝛿

Models of this form are called RPL because the choice probability Lj(δ) is a mixture of logits
with ƒ as the mixing distribution. The RPL is characterised by accommodating heterogeneity
as a continuous function of the parameters which are randomly and normally distributed.

Indicators
Enjoy time to read/relax in the vehicle
Stressfulness in the vehicle
Slower service (in-vehicle longer travel time
due to many stops during the travel)
Availability of alternative mode of transport
Accessibility (go where required)
Public transport timetable availability
Fixed start and finish times at work – each
day can vary
Rotating shift at work
Roster shift at work
Variable hours at work
Safety response for mode used in 1st trip
Safety response for mode used in 2nd trip
Safety response for mode used in 3rd trip
Frequency of bus or train
Punctuality of bus or train
Faster service (in-vehicle shorter travel time
due to fewer or no stops during travel
Cleanliness on public transport and stops
and platform
Travel time
Travel cost
Waiting time
Goodness-of-fit
GFI
AGFI
NFI
CFI
RMSEA
Lower bound
Upper bound
.239 (5.61)
1.060 (7.12)
.195 (4.44)

.201 (.152)
.834 (1.21)
.090 (.89)

.985
.978
.911
.931
.036
.000 (90% CI of RMSEA)
.076 (90% CI of RMSEA)

Conv.
.007 (.141)
.141 (1.11)
−.002 (–.04)

Group 1
Comf.
.136 (5.59)
1.178 (4.89)
−.056 (–3.84)

.989
.981
.975
.981
.017
.000 (90% CI of RMSEA)
.067 (90% CI of RMSEA)

−.717 (–.06)
−.215 (–1.01)
−.202 (–1.20)
1.250 (10.41)
.970 (7.84)
.870 (7.11)

.992 (4.51)
.331 (5.36)
.916 (6.12)
.071 (.21)
.010 (.11)
.069 (.09)

Safety

−.021 (–.98)

Group 2

−.201 (–7.10)

Flex.

Regression weights

Table 4. The γ vector matrix of standardised regression weights of indicators (t-statistics in parenthesis).
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−1.212 (–6.74)
−.024 (–4.15)
−1.512 (–6.14)

−1.015 (–.10)
−.008 (–.84)
−1.111 (–.76)

.984
.971
.901
.990
.039
.017 (90% CI of RMSEA)
.057 (90% CI of RMSEA)

.568 (3.84)

.450 (.05)

Satis.

.213 (.12)
.201 (.10)
.415 (.09)

Group 3

1.415 (7.11)
1.517 (6.10)
1.211 (4.14)

Reliab.
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Regression weights of indicators representing LVs
In this paper, 20 indicators were selected to explain six LVs. Several groups of factor analytic models were examined to identify the weights of indicators to represent the LVs and
the models were estimated using AMOS v.19 software. To understand the validity of the
indicators that represent LVs there are exploratory analyses described in Table 4.
In group 1 in Table 4, the indicators representing comfort and convenience have been
evaluated to check their validity. Six indicators were assumed to have significant impact on
the variables comfort and convenience. After estimating the regressions weights, it was found
that indicators have a significant effect on representing comfort and convenience variables.
The influence of stressfulness is higher on comfort while people travel, whereas convenience is highly dependent on accessibility of mode in their choice process. According to
group 1 in Table 4, the regression weights of the first three indicators are higher and more
significant than convenience. This indicates that these three indicators are more relevant
to represent comfort rather than convenience. For the rest of the indicators in group 1, the
regression weights are more relevant to convenience as they are statistically significant and
have higher regression weights than comfort.
Other LVs in groups 2 and 3 can also be explained in a similar way and the overall
acceptability of these weights was satisfactory. Evidence of an acceptable level was achieved
through various goodness-of-fit criteria such as goodness-of-fit index (GFI), adjusted goodness-of-fit index (AGFI), normed fit index (NFI), comparative fit index (CFI) and rootmean-square error of approximation (RMSEA).

Results
Table 5 summarises the estimated results of RPL models. A number of SDVs and LVs were
integrated in the models to observe the overall impacts of relevant attributes on traveller
mode choice.
The analysis suggests that both models produce similar results when considering SDVs,
but when LVs are included the importance of LVs exceeds those of SDVs. For example,
findings from both the socio-demographic random parameter logit (SDRPL) model (that
includes SDVs only) and the hybrid RPL (HRPL) model (that includes both SDVs and LVs)
suggest that ‘travel time’ had a greater impact on traveller mode choice than ‘travel cost’.
Also, the effect of ‘trip purpose’ on mode choice was shown to decrease between SDRPL
and HRPL and the same scenario was found for the effects of ‘family size’, ‘full time workers’
and ‘trip rate’. An interesting outcome was the identified decrease in the effect of ‘waiting
time’ on mode choice in the HRPL model. This finding is consistent with those of the
BTS report (BTS, 2012) which suggests a growing uptake of public transport by travellers
who appear to place less importance on waiting time. Unlike the SDRPL model, however,
the HRPL model identified ‘age’ as a significant factor in mode choice, particularly in the
case of elderly people who generally seek a comfortable or convenient mode of transport.
Similarly, the effect of ‘car ownership’ is higher in the HRPL model which indicates that a
car maximises the desired utility that may be induced by LVs rather than SDVs.
The importance of LVs to travellers is clearly observed in the HRPL models. All of them
are statistically significant except the variable ‘flexibility’. The variables with the highest
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Table 5. Modelling results.
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Attributes
Random parameter in utility functions
Travel cost (mean)
Travel cost (st.dev.)
Waiting time (mean)
Waiting time (st.dev.)
Age (mean)
Age (st.dev.)
Car ownership (mean)
Car ownership (st.dev.)
Having children (mean)
Having child (st.dev.)
Trip purpose (mean)
Trip purpose (st.dev.)
Comfort (mean)
Comfort (st.dev.)
Convenience (mean)
Convenience (st.dev.)
Safety (mean)
Safety (st.dev.)
Flexibility (mean)
Flexibility (st.dev.)
Reliability (mean)
Reliability (st.dev.)
Satisfaction (mean)
Satisfaction (st.dev.)
Non-random parameter in utility functions
Travel time
Gender
Income
Family size
Full time workers of HH
Trip rate
Distance travelled
Mode constant
Car as a passenger (base)
Car as a driver
Train
Bus
Heterogeneity around the mean
Travel cost: income
Waiting time: income
Age: Income
Car ownership: income
Having child: income
Purpose: income
Comfort: income
Convenience: income
Safety: income
Flexibility: income
Reliability: income
Satisfaction: income
Model statistics
Log likelihood function
McFadden pseudo R-squared
AIC
Modal choice probability
Car as a driver
Car as a passenger
Train
Bus

SDRPL (t-values)

HRPL (t-values)

−3.14 (–4.15)
.41 (3.11)
−1.76 (–3.19)
.03 (5.00)
−.111 (–.05)
.25 (1.891)
1.86 (5.11)
.01 (4.51)
−1.77 (–4.11)
.06 (4.00)
.071(3.01)
.04 (3.12)

−2.09 (–3.00)
.70 (2.22)
−1.70 (–4.00)
.09 (3.94)
−.091(–1.60)
.49 (1.70)
1.94 (5.55)
.05 (3.55)
−1.81 (–5.01)
.09 (5.19)
.062 (3.00)
.02 2.72)
3.51 (8.79)
.11 (6.66)
3.25 (5.46)
.02 (4.36)
5.51 (10.22)
.09 (7.01)
.72 (.80)
.03 (1.21)
5.71 (9.01)
.01 (5.15)
1.25 (3.00)
.10 (3.25)

−1.20 (–4.10)
.40 (1.89)
1.99 (2.11)
.90 (1.12)
.94 (.56)
.89 (2.55)
−.81 (–2.22)

−1.13 (–4.64)
−.214 (–2.01)
1.46 (1.99)
.89 (1.00)
.93 (.07)
.85 (2.70)
−.26 (–1.90)

0
−2.09 (–3.00)
−2.21 (–4.41
−.15 (–4.89)

0
−2.56 (–10.0)
−2.41 (–4.15)
−.103 (–3.11)

−.129 (–3.51)
−.48 (–5.01)
−.07 (–.98)
.011 (2.91)
−.1 (–3.16)
.001 (3.01)

−.011 (–4.11)
−.033 (–4.15)
−.11 (–1.96)
.61 (4.15)
−.19 (–4.07)
.052 (3.11)
.101 (4.21)
.112 (3.80)
.51 (10.51)
.052 (1.80)
.35 (9.10)
.089 (4.11)

−696.80
.28
.0165

−576.53
.38
.0136

.720
.204
.049
.053

.770
.211
.020
.033
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impact in both years were ‘safety’ and ‘reliability’, followed by ‘comfort’ and ‘convenience’.
Overall, the impact of LVs on mode choice was greater than the impact of SDVs.
As usual in model statistics, the values of McFadden pseudo R-squared are inflated
from SDRPL which indicates that the HRPL is better for understanding the traveller mode
choice heterogeneity. According to Akaike information criterion (AIC), HRPL represents
the lower AIC which means that the predicted values using this model are closer to the real
values compared to SDRPL model and the lowest AIC values signify the best model. Thus,
HRPL models are better than SDRPL models in this case and the HRPL technique is more
appropriate for interpreting the relationship between travellers and TfNSW.
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An inferred relationship between traveller and TfNSW
According to the results above, some of the attributes (such as travel time and comfort) are
influential on the traveller decision-making process and TfNSW is able to adjust or control
some of those attributes to meet traveller expectations. An interaction in such a way between
service providers and users reflects a relationship indicated in AT. Furthermore, travellers
(the principal) provide their satisfactory or unsatisfactory feedback or opinions to TfNSW
about the available services which are treated as delegated tasks for TfNSW (agent).
As suggested by the results described in Section 3, travellers demonstrate their expectations for safe, reliable, comfortable and convenient journey considering LVs whereas,
according to SDVs, travellers expect reasonable costs, and less travel and waiting time for
trips. Although travellers explicitly state their preferences, public transport use is substantially lower than car use which indicates goal/choice conflict (also called moral hazard).
Again, information asymmetry also exists in the traveller and TfNSW relationship. For
example, once LVs are included in the model, the SDVs (e.g. waiting time, travel time)
become less influential (in terms of coefficients) on the decision made by travellers. Thus,
travellers have more information than does the TfNSW about the attributes of their (travellers) utility function and only travellers possess information about the importance that
they attach to this utility which contributes to information asymmetries.
Transport service should reflect these preferences and used by TfNSW in the public
transport service to improve the agency problem. At the same time, most travellers use
private cars to enjoy expected trips. In this situation, travellers take the mode – either public
transport (e.g. train, bus) or private transport (e.g. car) – that maximises the satisfactory
condition or utility. TfNSW has the experiences and skills to provide the satisfactory or
expected services but due to internal constraints, such as limited budget, traveller may be
provided with unsatisfactory services and an agency problem arises. In the other words,
TfNSW wants to reduce the cost of the transport services and seeks to provide maximum
utility for the users with the minimum cost. In contrast, travellers expect optimal service
(i.e. customer focused) to assure the effective contract and, as a result, expenses for TfNSW
may increase eventually. Hence, reducing cost is treated as maximisation of TfNSW’s utility
and getting optimal/expected service from TfNSW is maximisation of traveller’s utility i.e.
satisfaction.
Travellers are not in a position to be aware, at a reasonable level, about the implementing
phase of mode service undertaken by the TfNSW and this leads to choice conflicts as indicated in AT. Thus, TfNSW may be directly influenced by other related stakeholders such as
politicians, administrators, and transport companies, and the traveller’s direct participation
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Table 6. Forecasting changes in traveller mode choice.
Base year mode
share in %
Mode
Car as a driver
Car as a passenger
Train
Bus

SDRPL
72.0
20.4
4.9
5.3

HRPL
77.0
21.1
2.0
3.3

Predicted changesa
Scenario 1 (S1)
SDRPL
−.07
.33
−.04
−.08

HRPL
.21
.17
.08
−.04

Scenario 2 (S2)
SDRPL3
−1.00
.95
−.08
.51

HRPL
−.85
.52
−.01
.48

Scenario 3 (S3)
SDRPL
−.54
.64
−.06
.22

HRPL
−.32
.35
.04
.22

a
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Changes are the differences in the probabilities between changed and unchanged conditions.

in TfNSW’s project finalising stage is limited (Anwar, 2013). Therefore, choice conflicts
occur and ultimately agency problems arise.
The reason behind choice conflicts has been identified through RPL models. In these
models, various choice attributes are analysed and interpreted and the models summarise
the dominant attributes (such as travel time, waiting time, comfort, safety) which are eventually travellers’ expectations of the service. Based on these expected attributes, the mode
choice probability is calculated. In this present research, the probability of private transport
use was found to be the highest indicating travellers’ dissatisfaction with existing public
transport service and an agency problem. Therefore, increasing public transport use may
be an option to reduce the agency problem.

A pathway to agency problem improvement in transport services
Travel demand forecasting and policy evaluation methods have not been discussed in the
last decade to the same extent as the estimation of hybrid discrete choice models. This forecasting method is used in this paper to investigate how to minimise the agency problem.
According to the specifications of the MIMIC model, change in the explanatory variables should cause changes in the LVs. These changes may have an impact on the MIMIC
model as well as on the utility functions in the choice model. Due to the changes in utility
function, traveller mode choice probabilities are affected accordingly. The changes in the
choice forecasting probabilities may be caused by the variations in explanatory variables
related to SDVs. The changes in the explanatory variables sijr and the tangible attributes Xijk
may affect the choices implicitly through the LVs or the alternative utilities by which the
changes in choice probabilities may be observed.
The changes in traveller choices, which are associated with the overall transport system
in a city, are allied with changes in SDVs. Again, the changes in SDVs contribute to construct the psychological (i.e. LVs) mindset of human beings and, eventually, the LVs impact
on mode choice to influence the overall structure of trips. Thus, the transport forecasting
context is an interrelationship among various observed and unobserved factors related to
the transport management system. It is understood that traditional mode choice models
(without LVs) are not generally sensitive to policies which affect the transport management system. Policies are associated with the changes to the management system which,
in turn, may have an impact on the observed mobility structure of the travellers. Thus, the
LVs would be able to capture transport system changes because the explanatory variables
are related to demographics as well as the alternatives included in the MIMIC model to
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evaluate the traveller motivational process. This is an important measure to be considered
when forecasting changes using the estimated models.
On the basis of the empirical case presented in this study, three hypothetical scenarios
are tested (i) increase in income by 10% for all respondents (S1); (ii) decrease in travel
cost and waiting time by 10% for public transport (S2) and (iii) implementing both (i) and
(ii) concurrently (S3). The variation of income affects directly: (i) the LV, as income is an
explanatory variable in the MIMIC model and (ii) the utility functions, due to inclusion
of it in the utility functions. These scenarios are modelled to observe the increase of public
transport use which avoids the agency problem.
Table 6 presents the base year market shares, which are estimated by each model under
no-change conditions along with market share changes predicted by the estimated models
considering three hypothetical scenarios.
The forecast changes do not have the same direction for all modes. Three scenarios
have been considered here to understand the predicting policies. For S1, the variations in
the HRPL model have a positive direction for all modes except the bus. According to the
SDRPL model under the same scenario, only train use is increased. Increasing income may
contribute to increase in the usage of public transport though only bus usage is forecast
negatively with a nominal coefficient value in the forecasting model. The reason may be
that the people who have adequate income do not like to be exhausted by self-driving and
are happy to use public transport. Another example may be brought to mind here: the cost
of travel by train to Sydney Airport is very expensive and the cost may motivate people to
use their car despite the train being a very convenient way to travel to the airport. Therefore,
increasing income may have an influence on the decision to take the train rather than the
car. This indicates that increasing an individual’s income may prompt the travellers to travel
by train. This is an interesting finding to help policy-makers.
As per Scenario 2, the probabilities of train and bus use are increased in both the SDRPL
and HRPL models. This implies that reduced travel cost and waiting times are helpful in
reducing travel by car. Furthermore, it is observed that the predicted changes to train and
bus use probability are the highest in the SDRPL model of S2, compared with other scenarios. When service is frequent enough, people may not perceive waiting as much of a
burden (Iseki, Taylor, & Miller, 2006). When people know the service schedule with a high
degree of certainty, they can adjust their arrival to a transit facility to reduce waiting time
(Evans, 2004; Reed, 1995). By providing on time operation of the transit service, people can
reduce waiting time. Due to its readily available schedules and more dependable service,
people generally perceive waiting times for commuter trains less burdensome than waiting
times for irregular bus services (Evans, 2004). Therefore, reduction in the uncertainty (or
increase in reliability) in waiting time is likely to reduce the disutility (or increase the utility)
of transit service (Reed, 1995).
In Scenario 3, the SDRPL model shows that probabilities of car use, both as a driver and
as a passenger, are reduced while the conditions of S1 and S2 are implemented concurrently.
On the other hand, the probability of train usage is higher than the HRPL model as increasing; ‘individual income’ and reduced travel cost and waiting time are included together.
Additionally, as expected, the HRPL model in S1 predicts an increase in private modes
of travel due to increasing income as a changed condition, while the other HRPL models in
S2 and S3 forecast a decrease in private modes because of inclusion of reduced travel cost
and waiting time as a changed condition. This may indicate that the hybrid RPL models
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are effectively more sensitive, as expected, but this higher sensitivity does not imply just
a simple amplification of the effects involved. Consequently, the importance of including
LVs in the choice models is even clearer.
It is understood that increasing income, reducing travel costs and waiting times have the
ability to attract travellers to public transport rather than to private modes of transport and
results in minimising the agency problem. After implementing these hypothetical scenarios,
it is found that the probability of private transport use has been reduced to a reasonable level
and the probabilities of public transport (train and bus) use have been increased to some
extent (Table 6). It confirms that integrating traveller choice preferences in transportation
planning helps to improve the traveller and TfNSW relationship by reducing the agency
problem. Therefore, it can be concluded that traveller-demand oriented changes in relevant
attributes can minimise the agency problem in the relationship.

Conclusions and policy responses
The contribution of this study is threefold. Firstly, it argues the applicability of AT to the
provision of transport services; which is a new dimension to present traveller preference in
the traveller choice process. Secondly, it models the LVs and SDVs separately and concurrently to explore their influences of choice attributes on traveller decisions and by which the
relationship between traveller and TfNSW is addressed. Thirdly, it demonstrates the mode
choice probability analysis as an approach to reduce the agency problem.
The analysis of the traveller-TfNSW relationship is relevant for transport policy formulation. As described, the relationship is addressed by the traveller choice preferences.
If the heterogeneity in traveller choice is fully understood, the relevant organisation i.e.
TfNSW would be able to provide satisfactory service for the users. Therefore, the nature of
the demand and behaviour of travellers should be included in the transport policy for the
policy to be worthwhile.
This study finds that the travellers of the SSD are inclined to use private cars rather than
use public transport and this indicates TfNSW’s dearth of awareness about travellers’ utility
functions and choices. To avoid the agency problem, policy responses should pay more
attention to the traveller utility functions. It is well validated by this research that transport
policy-makers should recognise traveller utility functions at the policy formulation level. As
well, this study clarifies the nature of traveller preference attributes, which form the traveller
utility function, in the relationship between traveller and TfNSW. The study identifies the
attributes of the traveller-TfNSW relationship that are most important to travellers. Thus,
the attributes that are most important to travellers should influence policy finalisation.
Furthermore, the behavioural findings and modelling techniques have direct policy and
planning interventions in future transport management. Firstly, as LVs are found as significantly important in travel behaviour, ignoring them in the planning process could result in
serious errors in public transport management. Therefore, to achieve the set objectives fixed
by TfNSW and transport planners systematic attention to LVs is required in transportation
planning and policies. Secondly, integrating the LVs in the relationship between travellers
and TfNSW reduces the agency problem because of the understanding that comes from
more realistic descriptions of travellers’ decision-making.
In order to minimise the agency problem, reducing some SDVs such as travel cost and
waiting time has a significant effect on switching private transport use to public transport
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use. This type of SDVs constitutes the LVs and, eventually, LVs lead to traveller behaviour
changes. It is also observed that increasing income works to reduce private car use. This
research evaluated three hypothetical scenarios, which could be helpful in reducing the
agency problem in the relationship between travellers and TfNSW. It was found that in the
hypothetical scenarios the probability of car use was decreased and this is the key motivation
to minimise the agency problem in the relationship. However, the response of the TfNSW
towards travellers’ desires is highly complex because people of different socio-economic
backgrounds have different expectations. This paper simplifies the response mechanism
by examining ways to decrease the agency problem that helps transport policy-makers to
incorporate the findings of this study into future policies.

Note
1. 
The authors employed econometric methods similar to those that have been used by Anwar
et al. (2014).
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